In 1914, the actions of German political and military decision-makers depended, not merely on the machinery of the government, army, and navy, but also on the public's attitudes to the military, military service, and military conflict. No German leader could ignore the complicated responses and coalitions of political parties and their electorates required to wage war. The likelihood of revolution, the willingness of citizens to put up with economic dislocation and to bear the burden of human suffering--or the catastrophic effects of war--rested on the attitudes and behaviour of this wider public, which in turn derived from their experiences and memories of the wars of unification, their political support for and opposition to the army and navy, and their contact with the military as conscripts and volunteers, or as relatives of soldiers and veterans. The lessons of foreign wars, the evaluation of enemies, and the imagination of 'wars of the future' also played a part. How and why did German leaders help to bring about a European war in 1914 which so many observers had predicted might turn into a disaster?This is the third volume of Mark Hewitson's study of the violence of war in the German lands during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It examines the contradictory legacy of the 'wars of unification' on popular conceptions of military conflict in the changing public sphere of the Wilhelmine era. The decisions, and unexpected consequences of decisions, which led to war in 1914 can only be understood in this context.