This is a book on metaethics-in particular, an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of morality.  After carefully exploring the metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a new and in-depth theory of moral realism.  Starting with the firm recognition of the importance of our common sense belief that we possess a great deal of moral knowledge-that, for example, some acts are objectively right and some objectively wrong-the book goes on to examine the metaphysical grounds of various skeptical responses to this perspective. In great part, the book is devoted to developing a version of realist metaethics: specifically, developing in detail realist theories of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties.Concluding with the rejection of prominent contemporary forms of moral anti-realism, Kulp presents a rigorous non-naturalistic theory of moral realism, and a vindication of the basic commitments of commonsense moral thought.