This book argues that contemporary liberal societies are rife with civic divisions related to the past, and that coming to terms with this past is a phenomenon of utmost importance for citizens and liberal societies. It has been assumed that, however widespread and deep this phenomenon, this history or past is outside the bounds of the most prominent theory of liberal justice, i.e. Rawls’s theory. This book argues that this is a mistake, that the scope of justice needs to encompass historical rectification, and that Rawls’s theory must show concern for historical injustice. This book examines the empirical and normative evidence granting the significance of historical rectification. It argues that coming to terms with a past shaped by political violence bears extremely high importance to liberal societies. This book is of interest to contemporary political philosophers, political theorists, and those interested in the role of principles of justice for politics and public political culture. It draws on fundamental Rawlsian insights and concepts to rigorously theorise some of the most important and recurrent challenges in addressing past wrongdoing.